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Barnett: When the Landlord Resorts to Self-Help: A Plea for Clarification

WHEN THE LANDLORD RESORTS TO SELF-HELP:
A PLEA FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE
LAW IN FLORIDA
WALTER

E.

BARNETT*

There are probably few lawyers in general practice or specializing
in real estate transactions who have not been asked by a landlord
whose tenants will neither vacate nor pay rent: "Why can't I just go
in and move their things out on the sidewalk?" Chances are that the
lawyer sat back rather stunned by the idea, and finally said, "I
wouldn't advise it in any event." Whether this advice was prompted
by an unconscious aversion to nonjudicial remedies or a conscious
desire to avoid situations that might be productive of violence, it is
highly unlikely that it was prompted by a clear understanding of
the client's civil and criminal liabilities in such situations. It is surprising that so simple a question cannot be promptly answered today
by lawyers in many American jurisdictions. The purpose of this
article is to examine the remedy of self-help from the perspective of
Florida law.' Because much of the substance is in reference to statutory law, which varies considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
the author has employed judicial decisions from other states for
2
comparative purposes only.
Briefly put, the question to be examined is whether the landlord
may evict a tenant without the aid of the courts. Although there are
other ways of interpreting "the landlord's right of self-help," its use
in this article is confined to efforts toward eviction. Before examining
the law on the question, however, it is desirable first to discuss briefly
the preconditions for any eviction of a tenant.
SOME PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

Perhaps the most essential precondition to any removal of an undesirable tenant, whether the removal be effected by self-help or by
court proceeding, is that the landlord must be legally entitled to im*B.A. 1954, Yale University; LL.B. 1957, University of Texas; Diplame 1958,
College of Europe, Belgium; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Miami.
I. A brief treatment of the Florida statutes and cases is found in 2 BOYE.R,
FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSAcrIONS §§37.11-.15 (1966). The cases in which the
question is litigated would rarely involve much money, so any great expenditure
of time and effort by counsel to research the law thoroughly would rarely be
rewarded. On reading the Florida cases one senses this lack of thorough research
and advocacy by the counsel involved.
2. A recent compilation that digests cases on this subject from almost all
the states, but which fails to treat the statutes underlying those cases, may be found
in Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 177 (1966).
[238]
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mediate possession of the leased premises. Yesterday's lawyer would
say that the landlord must have a "right of entry" against the tenant.
What circumstances will entitle the landlord to immediate possession
is a matter rarely understood by laymen and occasionally misunderstood by lawyers.
Generally speaking, in the absence of statutory modification of
the common law, the landlord is entitled to immediate possession
only upon termination of the tenancy. As long as the tenancy exists,
the tenant is entitled to exclusive possession of the leased premises.3
And a tenancy is not terminated merely by the tenant's failure to pay
rent, or by his default on any other covenant contained in the lease,
nor does the landlord have the right to terminate the lease in such
circumstances unless it expressly so provides. 4 Stated another way,
the landlord is not excused from performance of the lease because
the tenant fails to perform, for courts traditionally have regarded the
respective obligations of landlord and tenant as independent of each
other. It has been said that this is a good example of a legal rule in
which the aspect of a lease as a conveyance has prevailed over its
aspect as a contract. 5 So the tenancy remains in effect despite the tenant's default, and the landlord is relegated to an action for debt or
damages or, in the case of default in payment of rent, to distress of
the tenant's goods.
How then is a tenancy brought to an end so as to entitle the landlord to immediate possession? The answer depends on what kind
of tenancy is involved. If the tenancy is for a definite term, it is
brought to an end by expiration of the term.6 In Florida, the tenancy
for a term can exist only by written lease; all oral leases are declared
by statute to be tenancies at will.7 Likewise, all written leases that
create a tenancy from period to period but fail to place a definite
3. The conclusion follows from the very essence of a lease, which is a transfer
to the tenant of the present right to possession of the land, the landlord retaining
a reversion, or future possessory estate in the land. See 2 BoYER, FLORIDA REAL
ESTATE TRANSAarIoNs §35.03 (3) (1966). This does not mean that the landlord has
no right whatever to enter during the tenancy. He is privileged to do so at reasonable times and in a reasonable manner to determine whether waste is taking
place and to discover the necessity for, as well as to make, repairs (if by lease or
statute he has a right or duty to make them). I RSTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS
§186 (1965). At common law he was also privileged to enter to demand, or to
distrain for, rent in default. Id. §187. But the common law privilege to enter to
distrain for rent apparently no longer exists in Florida. See Van Hoose v. Robbins,
165 So. 2d 209, 211 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
4. 1 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§3.11, 3.94 (Casner ed. 1952).
5. Id. §3.11.
6. Id. §3.88.
7. FLA. STAT. §83.01 (1965): "Any lease of lands and tenements, or either,
hereafter made, shall be deemed and held to be a tenancy at will, unless the
same shall be in writing signed by the lessor. ... "
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term on the tenancy are deemed to create a tenancy at will.8 The
statutes then provide that a tenancy at will can be terminated by the
giving of a prescribed notice by either party, the length of the notice
being dependent upon the periods at which rent is payable.9 The
net effect of these statutes is to assimilate oral tenancies for a term,
oral and written tenancies at will, and oral and written tenancies
from period to period. All of these are called by the statutes "tenancies at will" but are treated as the tenancy from period to period was
treated at common law. Such a conclusion derives from the fact that
these tenancies can be terminated only at the end of a rental payment
period by giving prescribed notice as required by statute for the rental
payment period in question.1O
These observations on termination of tenancies are, of course,
subject to the qualification that the parties may, by their agreement,
provide for different or additional methods of termination. It is
quite common for a term lease contract to provide that, upon default
by the tenant on certain or even any of his covenants, the landlord
may terminate the lease before the end of the term by giving the
tenant his prescribed notice. If the tenant is in fact in default, and
the landlord follows the procedure for premature termination prescribed by the lease, the tenancy is terminated, and the landlord is
entitled to immediate possession."1 Similarly, there would appear to

8. FLA. STAT. §83.02 (1965): "Where any tenancy shall have been created by
an instrument in writing from year to year, or quarter to quarter, or month to
month, or week to week, to be determined by the periods at which the rent is
payable, and the term of which such [sic] tenancy is unlimited, such tenancy shall
be a tenancy at will ..
"
9. FLA. STAT. §83.03 (1965): "A tenancy at will may be terminated by either
party giving notice as follows: Where the tenancy is from year to year, by giving
not less than three months notice prior to any annual period; where the tenancy is
from quarter to quarter, by giving not less than forty-five days notice prior to the
end of any quarter; where the tenancy is from month to month, by giving not less
than fifteen days notice prior to the end of any monthly period, and where the
tenancy is from week to week, by giving not less than seven days notice prior to
the end of any weekly period."
10. Termination at the end of a rental payment period by the giving of advance
notice, the length of which varied with the length of the rental payment period,
was the distinguishing characteristic of the common law tenancy from period to
period.

1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §3.90 (Casner ed. 1952).

But the common

law tenancy at will was terminable at any time by either party without notice.
Id. §3.91. Of course, the Florida statutory "tenancies at will" are not treated
precisely as a periodic tenancy was treated at common law, considering that the
lengths of notice prescribed by the Florida statute differ from the lengths of notice
required at common law.
11. This statement should be qualified by noting that, on occasion, courts
of equity have asserted their power to prevent a forfeiture of the lease when the

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1966

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 2
1966]

WHEN THE LANDLORD RESORTS TO SELF-HELP

be no reason why a landlord and tenant cannot, by agreement, make
their own provisions for termination of the other types of tenancies
that are lumped together by the Florida statutes into the category
of "tenancies at will."12 Again, if, and only if, the landlord has fol-

lowed such provisions strictly, the tenancy is terminated and the
landlord entitled to possession. The point deserves emphasis because
the courts are emphatic in pointing out that the law abhors forfeitures.
Also laymen are notorious for jumping to wrong conclusions on
whether their "opponent" is in default on his obligations and for disregarding lease details on such matters as the giving of termination
notices.
As has been stated, in the absence of statutory modification of the
common law, the landlord is entitled to possession only upon termination of the tenancy. Florida has apparently modified the common
law rule by conferring on the landlord the right to immediate possession whenever the tenant defaults in payment of the rent, although
the statute fails to indicate whether the tenancy is terminated. 3 This
right is conferred without regard to whether a written lease for a
term or one of Florida's "tenancies at will" is involved. It has been
said that the legislature intended that this right be read into every
contract calling for the payment of rent, assuming there is no clear indication that the parties to the contract intended otherwise. 14 The
major problem that confronts one seeking to rely on this statutory
right lies in ascertaining whether the tenant is in fact in default on
default of the tenant consists of failure to pay a sum certain, such as rent, on the
day it was due and when it would otherwise be inequitable to enforce a forfeiture
upon the tenant. The theory of these decisions is that, though the lease provides
a right of forfeiture or premature termination in such event, the real purpose of
the provision is simply to give the landlord leverage to compel payment. Hence
equity should step in and avoid a forfeiture if the tenant now stands ready, willing,
and able to pay the sum due, plus interest, and the landlord has not changed
positions in the meantime. Some cases have extended this doctrine to other types
of defaults as well. See 1 AMEICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §3.96 (Casner ed. 1952);
2 BoYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSAcrIONS §35.13 (1966).
12. Although there are no Florida appellate cases in point, Florida Statutes,
section 83.03, quoted note 9 supra, is not in form mandatory, and no reason is perceived why the parties may not, by contract, make their own "law" in this area
as in so many other areas of landlord and tenant.
13. FLA. STAT. §83.05 (1965): "If any person leasing or re-renting any land or
house shall fail to pay the rent at the time it becomes due, the lessor may immediately thereafter enter and take possession of the property so leased or rented."
It is conceivable that this statute simply means the landlord is empowered to
terminate the tenancy in such event, rather than that he is entitled to possession
though the lease continues in effect. See Stephenson v. National Bank of Winter
Haven, 89 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1930). See also the further discussion of this statute
in the text at notes 78-83 infra.
14. Baker v. Clifford-Mathew Inv. Co., 99 Fla. 1229, 128 So. 827 (1930).
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his rent. One would think that this is merely a factual inquiry, but
such is not the case. Unless the agreement of the parties provides
that the rent is payable without demand at the lessor's home or office
or some other such place, the tenant is not in default until a demand
for the rent has been made at the leased premises within reasonable
hours on the day on which it is due.15 The same problem confronts
a landlord seeking to rely on a lease clause that provides for premature termination for default in the payment of rent.16
Some comment should be made about the Florida law governing
the effect of a holding over by a tenant for a term. It has already been
said that a tenancy for a term is brought to an end by the expiration
of the term. Accordingly, the landlord is entitled to immediate possession at such expiration. Actually, at common law a tenant for
a term who held over beyond the expiration of the term, without the
landlord's consent, took on that curious and rather ill-defined status
of "tenant at sufferance." The landlord had the election of treating
7
him either as a trespasser or as a tenant for an additional term.1
Because the courts had to have some way of characterizing the relationship of the parties until the landlord exercised this election,
the status of "tenant at sufferance" was probably invented as a conceptual way station for a tenant on the road to becoming trespasser
or tenant for an additional term. It was just a phrase used to describe
the tenant's status during the interim between the ending date of the
lease and the time the landlord exercised his election. Since little
was likely to occur during that interim, it was rare that the courts
were called upon to define the precise meaning of the status.' 8 Whatever else it meant, it is clear that at common law the landlord had a
right to immediate possession, without notice, against a tenant at
sufferance. 19 To say that he could elect to treat the tenant as a trespasser is perhaps another way of saying the same thing.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Actually, there is considerable difference of opinion whether the new
tenancy that may thus be imposed on the tenant is one for a term certain or from
period to period. Also opinions differ concerning the length of the term or period.
See I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §3.35 (Casner ed. 1952).
18. For an example of a case in which the court was called upon to define
the meaning of the status and decided that the status was practically equivalent
to that of a trespasser, see Margosian v. Markarian, 288 Mass. 197, 192 N.E. 612

(1934).
19. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §3.32 (Casner ed. 1952). When it is said
in the text that the landlord is entitled to immediate possession "without notice"
to the tenant, this means that no particular period of prior notice, not even a
"reasonable length of time," is required. It is probably true, however, that before
a landlord can evict a tenant at sufferance, either by self-help or by commencing
a court action for that purpose, he has to afford the tenant at least a minimal
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A Florida statute alters the common law governing holdovers in
several respects. 20 It states that the holding over shall be construed
to be a tenancy at sufferance unless the lease has been renewed by some
further instrument in writing. It then deprives the landlord of his
option to treat the holding over as a renewal of the term by providing
that the mere payment or acceptance of rent (and hence, by implication, the mere holding over of possession by the tenant) shall not be
construed to be a renewal of the term. The statute further provides
that if the holding over be continued with the landlord's written
consent, the tenancy will become a tenancy at will. Thus, the effect
of the statute appears to be that until there is a written renewal of the
lease or written consent of the landlord to continuation of the holding
21
over, the holdover tenant remains a tenant at sufferance indefinitely.
Since the statute implies no change in the rule that the landlord is
entitled to immediate possession, without notice, against a tenant at
sufferance, then that right would seem to continue as long as the
tenancy retains such character. But this conclusion is probably unsound. Suppose the landlord accepts an additional month's rent from
the holdover tenant. Is it likely that a court would hold the landlord entitled to possession before the expiration of such additional
period, and leave the tenant to recover back his rent pro rata on a
theory of unjust enrichment? A more plausible construction of the
statute would be that the landlord is entitled to immediate possession,
against such a "tenant at sufferance," only as long as he accepts no
new rent; and if he does accept rent, he is not entitled to possession
until the period covered by that payment expires. At the expiration
of such period, though, his right to immediate possession would revive automatically, that is, without necessity of any notice to the
tenant. Such a construction would give reasonable effect to the statute.
Conversely, any construction which held the landlord's right to
possession did not revive automatically would seem to conflict with
opportunity to vacate voluntarily, by making a demand on him for possession.
In other words, he has to let the tenant know that he is being treated as a
trespasser rather than as a tenant for an additional term.
20. FLA. STAT. §83.04 (1965).
21. See Brown v. Markham, 56 Fla. 202, 48 So. 39 (1909); Leaders Int'l Jewelry,
Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 183 So. 2d 242 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966). Despite the
wording of the statute requiring a writing for the tenancy at sufferance to be converted into one at will or for an additional term, a Florida court has held that
continued possession by the holdover tenant, together with payment of rent and
the making of substantial improvements, constitutes sufficient part performance
to entitle the tenant to enforce in equity an oral promise by the landlord to
renew the lease. See S. Lemel, Inc. v. 27th Avenue Farmers Mkt., Inc., 126 So. 2d
167 (3d D.C.A. Fla.), cert. denied mem., 133 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1961). Compare S.
Lemel, Inc. v. 27th Avenue Farmers Mkt. supra, with Schmerer v. Hammer, 155
So. 2d 710 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
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Florida's apparent intention that the tenancy at sufferance become a
"tenancy at will" (and hence terminable upon the giving of a certain
amount of notice) only in those cases in which the landlord's written
consent to the holding over is obtained.
SELF-HELP RIGHTS IN ENGLISH LAW

The beginning of any inquiry into the landlord's right of selfhelp should be to ask what rights he had at English common law.
Like the vast majority of American states, Florida has adopted the
common law of England to the extent that it is of a general nature
and is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States or the acts of the Florida Legislature. This adoption extended
to the statute laws of England, subject to the same qualification, and
encompassed only such law as was in effect down to July the 4th,
1776.22

It is difficult to say with any great assurance what right the landlord had at English common law because at a very early date the decisions of the courts began to concern themselves with the effect of
statutory enactments on such right. The great English legal historian,
Sir Frederick Pollock, in his work on Torts, contented himself with
the statement: "A person entitled to the possession of lands or tenements does no wrong to the person wrongfully in possession by entering upon him; and it is said that by the old common law he might
have entered by force." 23 Suffice it to say that both commentators
and courts, English and American, generally agree that at common
law a landlord entitled to possession committed no tort when
entering against a tenant wrongfully in possession and expelling him
and his goods, even by force (provided the force used did not exceed
24
that which was reasonably necessary).
With this tenet of the common law as a touchstone, the next step
is to ascertain whether and how it has been altered by statute. I
have chosen first to set forth the development of the law in England,
not because the English statutes have any force in Florida, 25 but be22.
23.

FLA. STAT.

§2.01

(1965).

TORTS 368 (6th ed. 1901).
24. See, e.g., Hewitt v. State ex rel. Palmer, 108 Fla. 335, 337, 146 So. 578, 579
(1933); 6-A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §28.19 (Casner ed. 1954); 1 RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), TORTS 158 (1965). In England, it may be that forcible entry was criminal,
even at common law. See 1 RUSSELL, CRiME 279-80 (12th ed. Turner 1964).
25. Although the statute adopting for Florida the general common and
statute laws of England was passed in 1829, it was not until 1845 that the Governor,
pursuant to an authorizing act passed that year by the Florida Legislature, commissioned an official compilation of the English statutes deemed to be in force
in Florida. The compilation, which appears in I FLA. STAT. ANN. 136-45 (1961), does
POLLOCK,
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cause the Florida statutes are to a considerable extent modeled upon
them and because the Florida Supreme Court has indicated that the
intent and purpose of the Florida statutes are the same as those of the
English statutes.26 The relevant English statutes are five in number
and are known collectively today as the Forcible Entry Acts.
In 1381 the statute of Richard II was enacted, providing in its
material portion that "none from henceforth make any entry into any
lands and tenements, but in case where entry is given by the law; and
in such case not with strong hand, nor with multitude of people, but
only in peaceable and easy manner."'2 The statute was criminal providing for punishment by imprisonment on conviction. The second
statute2s simply confirmed the first by commanding the justices of
the peace, upon complaint, to go to the place where any forcible
entry had been made and take and put in jail any violator, there to
await conviction. The third statute2 9 was the first to provide explicitly
a civil remedy to the person expelled. It commanded the justices to
restore possession to him and also gave him an action against the
violator in the form of assize of novel dissesin or writ of trespass,
which allowed for recovery of treble damages if a forcible entry was
found by the verdict (or a forcible detainer following a peaceable
entry). Restitution of possession was precluded, however, by this act
and by the fourth statute3 0 if the violator had had possession for
three or more years before the indictment was brought. Restitution
3
was available at first only to freeholders, but the fifth and last statute 1
extended restitution to tenants for years whose land had been forcibly
not include any of the English statutes relative to forcible entry and detainer.
Why they were omitted is a mystery since they were certainly of a general and
not a local nature, and no Florida statutes on the subject appear to have been enacted until 1868. Consequently there could hardly have been any claim of inconsistency with acts of the Florida Legislature. Other American states apparently
did consider these statutes (or at least that of 5 Rich. 2) as having been received
as part of the common law. See Gower v. Waters, 125 Me. 223, 227, 132 At. 550,
552 (1926).
26. In Goffin v. McCall, 91 Fla. 514, 520, 108 So. 556, 559 (1926), the court
said: "IThere is no purpose evident in the language of the Florida Statutes to
change or add to the conditions which under the English statutes constituted a
crime, but the purpose was merely to transform that which was a crime into a
private wrong or tort. A civil action was merely substituted for the criminal one."
Little reliance should be placed on this statement since the court was simply
making the point that no action for an unlawful entry would lie under the
statutes unless the complaining party had been in actual possession of the land
at the time of entry.
27. 5 Rich. 2, stat. 1, c.7 (1381).
28. 15 Rich. 2, c. 2 (1391).
29. 8 Hen. 6, c. 9 (1429).
30. 31 Eliz. 1, c. 11 (1588).
31. 21 Jac. 1, c. 15 (1623).
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entered or forcibly detained. These five statutes still comprise the
statutory law of England in this area. Of course, the Forcible Entry
Acts of England, like their American counterparts, were of general
applicability; they were applied to persons in all sorts of relationships,
not merely to landlord and tenant. Because of their general construction, they have caused about as much judicial confusion in England
as their American counterparts have caused in this country.
In regard to the criminal offense, earlier cases appeared to establish the rule that the indictment must allege a freehold title in the
complainant (or at least a term of years) so that a forcible entry
against a tenant at will,32 a tenant at sufferance, or a trespasser in
possession was not indictable. 3 3 Cases decided in the second quarter
of the 19th century, however, took the position that title was immaterial. The only questions were whether the complainant was in
possession at the time and whether the defendant had used force to
deprive the complainant of possession. Modern English practice appears to have followed this latter position, though it is still said that
if the entry was made against a mere trespasser or against a servant of
the defendant who had merely custody rather than possession, there
3
has been no offense under the Forcible Entry Acts. 4
On the civil side, it appears that actions were brought for forcible
entries based, in effect, on the statute of 1381 even before the third
statute, that of 1429, expressly conferred a civil remedy. The old
authorities appear to have taken the position that neither statute
could be the basis of a civil action for damages for the entry itself
unless the plaintiff had some title or right to possession as against
the defendant. Hence, if a landlord broke into a house in the possession of a tenant no longer entitled to possession, there could be no
recovery against the landlord either for the entry (though it was
forcible, and hence a criminal offense) or for his remaining on
the premises. 5 Presumably, the theory was that the entry must
amount to a disseisin or a trespass quare clausum fregit to be
actionable, but there could be no disseisin of a tenant, other
than a life tenant, and there could be no trespass to land by the
32. The reference here is, of course, to a tenancy at will at common law,
rather than to the peculiar Florida statutory "tenancies at will." At common law,
the landlord had the right to terminate a tenancy at will at any time, without
notice, so a tenancy at will was a rather precarious estate. See note 10 supra.
33. See the opinion of Lord Justice Scrutton in Hemmings v. Stoke Poges
Golf Club, [1920] 1 K.B. 720, 743-44 (C.A.).
34. See the opinion of Lord Justice Duke in Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf
Club, [1920] 1 K.B. 720, 751-52 (C.A.); ARCHIBOLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PEAcrIcE
IN CRIMINAL CASES §§3603, 3605 (35th ed. 1962).
35. See the opinion of Lord Justice Scrutton in Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf
Club, [1920] 1 K.B. 720, 744-46 (C.A.); Opinion of Justice Erskine in Newton v.
Harland, 1 Man. & G. 644, 666-67, 133 Eng. Rep. 490, 499 (1840).
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owner having the right to possession. The idea that the statute's
criminal prohibition in and of itself might render the entry tortious,
which seems to have occurred to a few American courts, 36 does not
appear to have been fully discussed and rejected in England until
1920.37 The rule that an action for trespass to land (that is, for an
invasion of the tenant's possession of the land) will not lie against
a landlord entitled to possession, though he commits a crime in
entering forcibly, has been conceded by the majority of American
courts as well.38
Suppose, however, that the landlord while entering directs force
not merely against the physical premises but also against the person
of the tenant or members of his family or, having entered, physically
expels the tenant and his belongings from the premises. May the
tenant recover for assault and battery, or for trespass de bonis asportatis? Although it is hard to believe that none of the earlier cases
involved acts directed against the person or goods of the tenant, it
was not until 1840, in the case of Newton v. Harland, 9 that an
English court squarely considered the question whether such invasions of personality and of personal property of the tenant might be
actionable. In that case, three out of four judges of the Court of
Common Pleas who were hearing en banc the point of law at an intermediate stage of the proceedings, ruled that such invasions were
actionable. Although the authority of the case was weakened because
the point was never ruled on by the full court and because two of the
other judges of the same court who heard the point at the trial of
the case agreed with the dissenter, Newton v. Harland was accepted
as good precedent by most American courts. 40 In spite of this, Newton
never was really accepted in England, either by the legal profession
or by the judges, 4' although it was followed in Beddall v. Maitland-2
and Edwick v. Hawkes43 by a judge of the Chancery Division of the
High Court of Justice. In 1920 Newton v. Harland and the cases
36. Reeder v. Purdy, 41 Ill. 279 (1866); Mosseller v. Deaver, 106 N.C. 494,
11 S.E. 529 (1890); Dustin v. Cowdry, 23 Vt. 631 (1851).

37. See the opinion of Lord Justice Bankes and Lord Justice Scrutton in
Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf Club, [1920] 1 K.B. 720, 731-33, 746 (C.A.).
38. 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §1.12 (1956); 1 RSrATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS
§185 (1965).
39. 1 Man. & G. 644, 133 Eng. Rep. 490 (1840).
40. PRossER, TORTS 125 (3d ed. 1964). It is interesting to note that the Florida
Supreme Court in Goffin v. McCall, 91 Fla. 514, 519, 108 So. 556, 558 (1926) inadvertently cited Newton v. Harland and Beddall v. Maitland without noting that
they had been overruled in England six years earlier.
41. See the opinions in Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf Club, [1920] 1 K.B.
720, 736, 739-40 (CA.).
42. 17 Ch. D. 174 (1881).
43. 18 Ch. D. 199 (1881).
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following it were overruled by a unanimous court of appeal in
44
Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf Club.
The theory of Newton v. Harland was that a trespass to the person
of the tenant or a member of his family (and, presumably, to the
tenant's goods) must be considered independently from the re-entry
upon the land itself, and would be tortious unless consented to or
privileged. Although it can be argued that in taking a lease a tenant
impliedly gives an irrevocable consent to re-entry by the landlord at
the lease's termination, 45 it is not so easy to imply consent to an
assault or battery upon the person of the tenant or rembers of his
family or to an interference with the tenant's possession and control
of his personal property. The only privilege the landlord might conceivably argue is that which allows one in possession of land to defend
his possession by expelling persons who lack his consent to be there.
The landlord's argument in Newton v. Harland went as follows: "I
have the right to possession, and by my re-entry I joined to such
right an actual occupation; therefore, in the eyes of the law, the land
is now in my possession, and no longer in that of my former tenant;
and I may then defend my possession against all intruders, including
my former tenant who has remained on the premises." The judges
who ruled against the landlord in Newton v. Harlanddid not disagree
with the premise that possession was in the landlord after re-entry.
Instead these judges maintained that the privilege to defend possession of land applies only to a lawful possession, and that the
defendant landlord could not allege he was in lawful possession if
that possession had been gained by a forcible entry contrary to the
criminal prohibition of the statute of 1381.46 It should not be
assumed that the judges were ultimately persuaded to rule as they
did simply by reason of this rather ingenious theory. Probably a more
compelling reason is indicated by the following passage from Justice
Erskine's opinion: "I cannot but apprehend that, if it were once
established at law that a landlord might, in all cases where his tenant
holds over, enter by force upon the premises and expel the tenant,
and thereby subject himself to no greater risk than the peril of an
indictment for a forcible entry, under which no restitution could
be awarded, the peace of the country would be endangered by the
frequent resort to their summary proceedings .......4 In contrast the
dissenting judge said: "For the preservation of the peace, the law
will punish for the forcible entry; but the tenant at sufferance being
himself a wrongdoer, ought not to be heard to complain in a civil
44.
45.

46.
47.

[1920] 1 K.B. 720 (C.A.).
1 HARPER & JAMFS, TORTS §3.15, at 255-56 (1956).
Newton v. Harland, 133 Eng. Rep. 490, 496-97, 499 (1840).
Id. at 499.
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action for that which is the result of his own misconduct and injustice." 48s These opposing views provide the gist of the controversy on
this subject in America as well as in England.
The case of Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf Club, which overturned
Newton v. Harland, is interesting in that it did not involve the eviction of a tenant in the true sense. Hemmings was simply an employee
of the golf club, which had allowed him and his family to occupy a
gate house in connection with his duties. When Hemmings stayed on
after his employment and neglected several notices to vacate, the club
sent some of its agents and employees to remove him and his belongings. He refused to leave on the ground that he had been unable
to find other lodgings due to the wartime housing shortage. No
active resistance was offered by Hemmings and his wife. Like our
present day sit-in demonstrators, they simply refused to budge and
were led or carried out bodily along with their belongings. 49 While
the legal status of Hemmings, who was more a custodial occupant
than a tenant, could conceivably have been distinguished from that
of the holdover tenant (or tenant at sufferance) in Newton v. Hatland, the court of appeal declined to do so and considered both to be
in no better position than a mere trespasser whose possession had
always been wrongful. There may also have been some question
whether the defendant landlord's actions amounted to a forcible
entry, but the case was nevertheless decided on that assumption.
A great deal of the reasoning of the court of appeal in Hemmings
was taken up by an analysis of the precedents and authorities prior to
Newton v. Harland. Beyond the idea that Newton v. Harlandmisread
the ancient precedents, it is possible to discern several reasons why the
court overruled that decision. One reason, previously mentioned, is
the rationale advanced by the dissenter in Newton - that the criminal
prohibition against a forcible entry hardly justifies making a civil
award to a wrongdoer whose very act of wrongdoing provoked the
entry. Another reason is that if a landlord cannot forcibly effect an
eviction without being liable in damages to the holdover tenant, it
must follow that the law confers a civil right of occupancy on the
48. Id. at 498.
49. A particularly poignant note is struck by the fact that Mrs. Hemmings
was seated in a chair with a baby in her arms, and the chair with both its human
occupants was lifted and deposited outside. One wonders why no resistance was
offered by Mr. Hemmings. Doubtless he had legal advice, and perhaps the following quotation from a work on English criminal law gives us the explanation:
"A person who unjustifiably seeks to retain possession of land by force is guilty
of a forcible detainer. Therefore, if a lessor uses force to recover possession of
land against a lessee who is holding over, and the lessee forcibly resists him, both
parties may be guilty of a crime." CRoss & JoNiEs, AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL
LAw 277 (4th ed. 1959).
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tenant, "the length of which is determined only by the law's delay" 50
in restoring possession to the landlord. Finally, it is unreasonable to
hold that there can be no cause of action for the entry itself while
allowing one for the removal of the tenant and his goods since the
very object of any "right of entry" is the recovery of exclusive possession, and the "right" is thus useless if it allows the landlord merely
to come in and cohabit the premises with the tenant. The court also
pointed out that in Jones v. Foley-' a landlord was held not liable
to a tenant, who wrongfully refused to vacate, for damage to the
tenant's furniture resulting from the landlord's dismantling the
house because such action did not amount to a forcible entry. Consequently, the law was in a rather ridiculous state: a landlord could
pull the roof down over his tenant's head without incurring liability,
yet could not dislodge him by more direct means.
How did the court of appeal fend off the notion that the peace
of the country would be endangered by landlords taking their remedies into their own hands? Lord Justice Bankes' answer was, "I have
no fear that the present decision will encourage lawlessness as was
suggested for the respondent. A person who makes a forcible entry
upon lands and tenements renders himself liable to [criminal] punishment, and he exposes himself also to the civil liability to pay
damages in the event of more force being used than was necessary
to remove the occupant of the premises, or in the event of any want
of proper care in the removal of his goods." 52 Lord Justice Scrutton
53
said practically the same thing.
The law of England on self-help has thus been left in the following position:54 A landlord entitled to possession may, of course,
enforce his rights by commencing an action in court for possession.
He may also regain possession by self-help, without civil or criminal
liability, if he can do so peaceably. If, however, any force is used in
regaining possession by self-help, either in effecting an entry or in
turning out the occupant, the landlord subjects himself to criminal
liability. He does not, however, subject himself to civil liability unless
(1) the force used exceeds that which was reasonably necessary to
regain possession, or (2) the force used results in death or serious
bodily injury. In either type of repossession by self-help, peaceable or
forcible, the landlord will be civilly liable for any damage to the
tenant's goods resulting from a lack of proper care in their removal.
50. Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf Club, [1920] 1 K.B. 720, 737 (C.A.).
51. [1891] 1 Q.B. 730.
52. Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf Club, [1920] 1 K.B. 720, 737 (C.A.).
53. Id. at 747.
54. See 1 HARPER & JAMEs, TORTS §3.15 (1956); MEGARRy, REAL PROPERTY 391
(3d ed. 1962); POLLOCK, TORTS 289-92 (15th ed. Landon 1951); 1 RUSSELL, CRIMaE
284-86 (12th ed. Turner 1964).
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One final question remains before turning to Florida's statutes
and cases: what is a forcible entry as distinguished from a peaceable
entry? The English authorities, both ancient and modern, have
consistently taken the position that a forcible entry is the use of
violence or threat of violence either to effect the entry or to remove
the occupants after entry. Thus, breaking open the doors or windows,
or beating the occupants, or threatening to do so, would constitute a
forcible entry. Opening a door with a key, or entering by an open
window, would not. Of course, a threat need not be verbal; the
possession of weapons, the presence of a number of companions, or
other "appearance" of readiness to use violence will suffice. 55
THE

FLORIDA STATUTES AND CASES

Lawfulness of a ForcibleEntry
The Florida statutes on forcible entry and unlawful detainer were
originally enacted by the "reconstruction" legislature of 1868.56 The
first important difference from the English statutes lies in the fact
that the prohibition of forcible entry enacted in 1381, though copied
almost verbatim, 57 was made the subject of civil rather than criminal
law and a civil remedy was prescribed. 58 Consequently, Florida
55. Milner v. Maclean, 2 Car. & P. 17, 172 Eng. Rep. 8 (K.B. 1825); ARCHBOLD,
op. cit. supra note 34 at §3602; PoLLocK, op. cit. supra note 54 at 290.
56. Fla. Laws 1868, ch. 1630 [hereinafter referred to collectively as "chapter
82," because they are codified in FLA. STAT. ch. 82 (1965)].
57. Compare the language of 5 Rich. 2, stat. 1, c. 7 (1381), quoted in the
text of this article at note 27 supra, with the following language of FLA. STAT. §82.01

(1965): "No person shall enter into any lands or tenements but in case where
entry is given by law, nor shall any person, where entry is given by law, enter with
strong hand or wi th multitude of people, but only in a peaceable, easy
and-open manner."
58. FLA. STAT. §82.03 (1965): "If any person shall enter or shall have entered
into lands or tenements in case where entry is not given by law, or if any person
shall enter or shall have entered into any lands or tenements with strong hand

or with multitude of people, even in case entry is given by law, the party turned
out or deprived of possession by such unlawful or by such forcible entry, by whatever right or title he held such possession, or whatever estate he held or claimed
in the lands or tenures of which he was so dispossessed, shall at any time within

three years thereafter be entitled to the summary remedy herein provided." The
remedial procedure, resulting in a judgment for restitution of possession and for
damages, is then set forth in §§82.06-.20. Actually, the Florida Legislature, in the
same year that it enacted these civil provisions now found in FLA. STAT. ch. 82
(1965), also enacted a criminal provision reading: "Whoever forcibly enters into the
possession of the lands and tenements of another, and does not, upon demand made
by the party entitled to possession, vacate the same within four days after the
demand, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars." FLA.
STAT. §821.30 (1965).
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courts have never had to wrestle with the problems discussed in the
preceding part of this article, namely, whether the entry itself was
civilly actionable because criminally prohibited, and if not, whether
any invasion of the tenant's interests of personality or of personal
property would nevertheless be actionable. In Florida, damages are
recoverable for a forcible entry though there has been no assault or
battery on the tenant or a member of his family and no interference with his belongings. But the entry must be tantamount to
a dispossession of the tenant.5 9
If sections 82.01 and 82.03 of the Florida Statutes were the only
ones bearing upon the substantive rights of the parties in this general
area of the landlord's right of self-help, there would probably be little
confusion. There are others, however. One, section 83.05,6 has already been mentioned. With this statute there does not appear to be
any problem. Though it expressly purports to give the landlord the
right to enter and take possession from a tenant in default on his
rent, nothing in the language of section 83.05 connotes that the right
might be exercised forcibly. Moreover, it was first enacted in 1828,
while sections 82.01 and 82.03 were enacted in 1868. Even if it were
concluded that in 1828 the right thus given might have been exercised forcibly (there being no prohibition on using force to effect a
right of entry, either at common law or, as we have seen, in the
Florida statutes of that era), the later statutes, sections 82.01 and
82.03, would have to be construed as modifying such right to the extent of making the use of force to effectuate it wrongful.
A more difficult problem is posed by section 85.18 of the Florida
Statutes. This statute has probably been overlooked by the courts
and the profession because it purports to deal with the conferring
of a lien in favor of keepers of hotels, apartment houses, rooming
houses, and boarding houses upon the goods and chattels of guests and
tenants for the latter's board, lodging, and occupancy. This statute
was enacted in 1874, which places it subsequent to the forcible entry
and detainer statutes 1 and hence in a position to modify or detract
from them. The crucial provision is the last sentence of the statute:
"Upon the nonpayment of such sums in accordance with the rules of
59. This last mentioned qualification is merely a surmise drawn from the
fact that §82.03 gives the statutory remedy to "the party turned out or deprived
of possession" and also from the fact that §§82.01 and 82.03 were enacted as a
"package," the latter apparently declaring the remedy for the former. But see
Adelhelm v. Dougherty, 129 Fla. 680, 176 So. 775 (1937), discussed infra at note
97, in which a tenant was allowed a remedy for "forcible entry" by means of an
action in trespass, wholly apart from this special chapter 82 procedural remedy.
The tenant in that case, however, had been deprived of possession.
60. FLA. STAT. §83.05 (1965) (see quotation note 13 supra).
61. FLA. STA. §§82.01-.20 (1965).
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such hotels, apartment houses, rooming houses or boarding houses,
the keeper thereof may instantly eject such guests or tenants therefrom."6 2 The addition of the word "tenants," together with the words
"apartment houses" and "rooming houses," to the statute by a 1933
amendment6s is a pretty dear indication that the statute does apply
to persons in the relationship of landlord and tenant in the types
of tenements covered by the statute, and not merely to persons in the
relationship of landowner and licensee or innkeeper and lodger. And
the language used by the statute surely carries the implication that
force may be used. Unfortunately, only one decided case and an attorney general's opinion have construed the provision. In the case,64
the Supreme Court of Florida found no unlawful or improper conduct on the part of a hotelkeeper who, in the absence of the plaintiff
guest, locked the door of the latter's room with his clothing in it and
on his return asked him to settle amicably the hotel's claim. It does
not appear from the case whether the hotelkeeper broke into the
room, secured entrance by means of a regular or skeleton key, changed
the locks, or had obtained the -guest's own key and simply refused
to give it back to him until the bill was settled. 65 The attorney
general's opinion 6 is only slightly more enlightening. After stating
that the statute authorized the owner or operator of a hotel or apartment house to eject guests or tenants who fail to pay for their lodging,
it continues: "The method of ejectment is discretionary, and so long
as it is reasonable, is authorized. Where an owner or operator of a
hotel or apartment house locks a tenant out of his room or apartment
for the tenant's failure to comply with the establishment's rules or
regulations for rental payments, it would appear that this type of
ejection is reasonable."
In the writer's opinion, a fair argument can be made that section
85.18 carves an exception out of the forcible entry statutes 7 so as
62. FLA. STAT. §85.18 (1965).
63. Fla. Laws 1933, ch. 16042, §44.
64. Kloeppel v. Bradford, 133 Fla. 695, 182 So. 839 (1938).
65. Even in the absence of a statute such as §85.18, a forcible entry by a
hotelkeeper into one of his lodgers' rooms probably would not contravene the
forcible entry and unlawful detainer statutes. To make out a case of forcible
entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in actual possession of the premises.
See Florida Athletic & Health Club v. Royce, 160 Fla. 27, 33 So. 2d 222 (1948);
Goflin v. McCall, 91 Fla. 514, 520, 108 So. 556, 559 (1926). In the relationship
of hotelkeeper and lodger, the former has "possession." See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY §3.7 (Casner ed. 1952). Thus, possible conflict between §85.18 and
§§82.01-.03 would not be as apparent in such a situation as in one involving a
landlord and his tenant. But it is not always easy to tell which type of relationship
is involved in a particular case. Ibid. See also Goodell v. Morris Lansburgh &
Associates, 77 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 1955).
66. 1953-1954 Os. ATr'Y GEN. FLA. 55.
67. FLA. STAT. §§82.01-.20 (1965).
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to permit a forcible entry upon and forcible dispossession of tenants
in apartment houses, rooming houses, hotels and boarding houses,
who are in default in payment of their rent. Apart from this possible
exception, any forcible dispossession of a tenant would appear
civilly actionable in Florida.
Lawfulness of a PeaceableEntry
The next question that needs to be asked is whether the Florida
statutes permit a landlord to regain possession by self-help, without
liability, if he can do so peaceably. In other words, is a peaceable
entry legal in Florida? For present purposes, we shall use the term
"peaceable entry" to mean any entry that falls short of a forcible
entry and is made by a landlord entitled to possession, upon the
possession of and without the consent of the tenant, and without
benefit of a court order. It is best to save the problem of differentiating a peaceable from a forcible entry until this question has
been discussed, since we need never reach that problem if we conclude that the only type of entry against the tenant's consent which
is legally permissible in Florida is one effected by court order. This
question of the legality of a peaceable entry is the most difficult and
confusing of all questions in this area in Florida.
There is no doubt that the statutes in chapter 82 do purport to
deal with something called "unlawful entry," in addition to "forcible
entry." The problem is to determine whether a peaceable entry by a
landlord entitled to possession falls within this statutory prohibition
of "unlawful entry." To begin with, let us examine carefully the
language of section 82.01 of the Florida Statutes: "No person shall
enter into any lands or tenements but in case where entry is given
by law, nor shall any person, where entry is given by law, enter with
strong hand or with multitude of people, but only in a peaceable,
easy and open manner." If the phrase "given by law" means "authorized by judicial proceeding," then the answer is simple-a peaceable entry is not legal. It seems clear, however, that the phrase does
not carry that meaning, for two reasons. First, the language is practically identical with that of the English statute of 1381, and the
latter statute was never construed in England to prohibit a peaceable
entry made without the benefit of legal process by one who was entitled to possession6s The English construction allowing self-help by
peaceable entry has been approved by most American courts as well.69
Second, the statute would make no sense if "given by law" is read to
68. See CROSS & JONES, op. cit. supra note 49, at 276; MEGARRY, op. cit. supra
note 54, at 391.
69. See PROSSER, TORTS 126 (3d ed. 1964).
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mean "authorized by judicial process." Such a reading would have
us believe that the second clause (in which the phrase "where entry
is given by law" is repeated) prohibits the use of force even in
effecting an entry authorized by court order, which is patently absurd.
Moreover, there would seem to be no need for the lawmaker to
prohibit forcible entries in the second clause if he has already in the
first clause prohibited all entries without the consent of the party in
possession except those authorized by court order. The more reasonable construction of the statute is that it prohibits all entries unless
the one entering is entitled to possession and then proceeds to prohibit even such a person from entering by force. The only difficulty
with this preferred construction is that the first clause of the statute
does nothing more than restate the common law, namely, that an entry
by one without a right of entry is a trespass. Perhaps the difficulty -is
mitigated when one considers that this Florida civil statute was copied
from an English criminal statute, and this first clause, in the latter
context, may have been more meaningful legislation. It must be admitted, however, that in England this first clause has apparently never
been given any effect in the criminal courts, the element of force
mentioned in the second clause being regarded as the gist of the
offense.
If, then, section 82.01 does not prohibit a peaceable entry by one
entitled to possession, do any of the other statutes do so? Section
82.0370 simply tracks the language of section 82.01, so it deserves no
independent scrutiny. Section 82.04,71 declaring the remedy for unlawful detention, is concerned with an entirely different wrong, but its
opening clause certainly seems to imply that a peaceable entry by
one having a right of entry is unobjectionable, the wrong of unlawful detention consisting of his holding over "after the expiration of
his right" against the consent of the party then entitled to the
possession.
The real difficulty is posed by section 82.02: "No person who shall,
without consent, enter in a peaceable, easy and open manner into any
lands or tenements, shall hold the same afterwards against the consent
of the party entitled to possession thereof." 72 This section is captioned,
"unlawful entry and unlawful detention defined," but section 82.01
70. FLA. STAT. §82.03 (1965) (see quotation note 58 supra).
71. FLA. STAT. §82.04 (1965): "If any person shall enter or shall have entered
in a peaceable manner into any lands or tenements, in case such entry is lawful,
and after the expiration of his right shall continue to hold the same against the
consent of the party entitled to the possession, the party so entitled, whether as
tenant of the freehold, tenant for years, or otherwise, shall be entitled to the like
summary remedy at any time within three years after the possession shall so have
been withheld from him against his consent."
72.

FLA. STAT. §82.02 (1965).
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in its caption likewise purports to define unlawful entry (along with
forcible entry). And, as already pointed out, section 82.03, which is
captioned "remedy declared for unlawful entry and forcible entry,"
tracks the language of section 82.01 rather than the language of
section 82.02. Furthermore, one would think that section 82.04,
which is captioned "remedy declared for unlawful detention," would
track the language of section 82.02, but instead it seems to redefine
unlawful detention in a different way and then declare the remedy.
So it is not easy to see how section 82.02 fits into the scheme of this
group of statutes as a whole, assuming there is an intelligible scheme.
It may be contended that the language of section 82.02 means that
a peaceable entry for which the consent of the person in possession
was not obtained is wrongful. But the phrase, "without consent," does
not tell us whose consent is referred to, and the second time the
statutory language uses the word "consent" it tells us that the consent
referred to is that of "the party entitled to possession." To adopt the
former view then would have us interpret the statute as if it read,
"no person who shall, without consent of the party in possession,
enter in a peaceable, easy and open manner into any lands or tenements, shall hold the same afterwards against the consent of such
party who was in possession." Such a rewriting of the statute seems
untenable. The better interpretation would seem to be that the
word "consent," the first time it is used, refers to the same party it
does the second time it is used, namely, the party entitled to possession. Thus, in our landlord-tenant context, section 82.02 would not
make unlawful a peaceable entry by the landlord since he is "the
party entitled to possession," and it is his consent that the statute
refers to and not that of the tenant in possession.
The only difficulty with this preferred interpretation is that it
cannot be applied, in many cases outside the landlord-tenant context, without contravening the provision of section 82.05, which reads,
"no question of title, but only a right of possession and of damages,
shall be involved in the action. ' ' 3 Suppose, for example, a peaceable
entry is effected by one claiming ownership of the land upon the
possession of another also claiming ownership (without the latter's
consent, of course). In such case, the "right of possession" depends on
resolution of the question who has title, which is prohibited. So if
the statute is to have any effect to render the entry in such case unlawful, the actual peaceful possession of the party entered upon must
be regarded as "entitling" him to possession. That the statute was
intended to render the entry in such case actionable in a chapter 82
proceeding may be a questionable assumption,'4 but even if the
73. FLA. STAT. §82.05 (1965).
74.

The courts might just as reasonably have concluded in such a case that
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assumption is correct, does it justify applying the same "fiction" to the
landlord-tenant context so that the tenant's actual prior possession
makes him, in the statutory language, "the party entitled to possession"? Undoubtedly, there is some virtue in consistency. It is submitted, however, that these two different contexts can reasonably be
treated differently. The procedure prescribed in chapter 82 is a
summary one, with special jury oaths and verdicts, and it is understandable that the legislature would not wish it to become bogged
down in complex and difficult issues of title that are more appropriately litigated in suits in ejectment or trespass to try title. But in
the landlord-tenant context, there is no question of title, but only one
of the right to possession, which is basically a question whether the
tenancy has been terminated. That the latter question can be litigated
by means of the procedure prescribed in chapter 82 is apparently not
open to doubt, since the remedy for unlawful detention declared by
section 82.04 is obviously available to a landlord against an overstaying tenant. The question whether the tenant has continued to
hold "after the expiration of his right" must inevitably be decided
since determination of the "party entitled to possession" cannot be made in the
chapter 82 proceeding without violating §82.05, it is impossible in such a proceeding
to determine whether there has been an "unlawful entry" under §82.02, the
former determination being an indispensable element of the latter. The dispossessed claimant to ownership would thus have been relegated to actions in
ejectment or trespass to try title in order to settle whether he or his rival
claimant is the "party entitled to possession," and thus to regain, or fail to regain,

possession. Though this possible alternative conclusion does not appear to have
been considered by the Florida Supreme Court in Florida Athletic & Health Club
v. Royce, discussed at note 92 infra, that decision, by making the assumption and
resorting to the "fiction" mentioned in the text, doubtless forecloses the matter
in this particular context (that of a peaceable entry by one claimant to ownership
upon the possession of his rival claimant). If the court had considered and
adopted this alternative conclusion making §82.02 inapplicable to controversies
involving rival claimants to ownership, and if it were also to hold that §82.02
does not make "unlawful" a peaceable entry by a landlord entitled to possession,
the two conclusions would be consistent both with the statutory language and
with each other. Yet one nagging question would remain: In what situations
does §82.02 make a peaceable entry unlawful? It may be that the legislature had
in mind simply to make available to a landowner who had been dispossessed
peacefully by one having no bona fide claim to the land (in other words, a trespasser, pure and simple) the summary restitution of possession afforded by the
chapter 82 proceeding. This notion is buttressed by (1) the fact that §82.02 does
not fit neatly in with its companion sections and had no counterpart in the
statutes of England or of most other American states and hence appears to be
largely sui generis, (2) the fact that the statutory language really prohibits
the withholding of the lands against the consent of the "party entitled to possession," rather than the entry itself, and (3) the fact that it was enacted in a
period in which the old order had just been violently overturned and a new order
had not yet been firmly established- the post-Civil War era of "reconstruction."
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therein. 75 In other words, when both parties claim ownership of the
land, the court may force them to resort to more appropriate judicial
proceedings by restoring them to their relative positions prior to
entry and refusing to try the issue of title. In the landlord-tenant controversy, on the other hand, if the court applies section 82.02 so as to
restore possession to a tenant who was not entitled to the possession
at the time the landlord entered peaceably, and refuses to try the
issue of who was entitled to the possession at that time, then the
plaintiff and defendant simply reverse positions and bring the same
type of summary proceeding under section 82.04. The court then
must decide the very issue of right to possession that it refused to
decide earlier. And, of course, if the landlord does in fact prove his
case in the second proceeding, the tenant who had just been restored
to possession by court order is now ousted by court order in the
same type of proceeding. Such a game of musical chairs would seem
an expensive waste of the court's time.76

75. See State ex rel. Rich v. Ward, 135 Fla. 885, 185 So. 846 (1939) and cases
cited therein.
76. If the Florida courts were to conclude that a peaceable entry by a landlord entitled to possession is not unlawful under §82.02, as is suggested in the
text, another rather intriguing question would arise. This question is whether
other "rights of entry" known to property law, such as a right of entry arising
from a fee simple subject to condition subsequent, could be exercised peaceably
without giving rise to an action for unlawful entry under §82.02. Such "rights of
entry" are more commonly referred to today as "powers of termination." Although
the question whether the condition subsequent has been violated, so as to permit
exercise of the "right of entry," is in many ways similar to the question whether
a lease has been terminated, the writer believes that the former does involve,
in the true sense, a "question of title," while the latter involves only the "right
of possession." It is true that in many respects the nonfreehold estates of tenancy
are equivalent to ownership, but the courts have always recognized that they are
simply temporary possessory interests, whereas a fee simple subject to condition
subsequent, though it may terminate sooner than some tenancies for years, should
be regarded as truly a form of ownership or "title." Thus, in a chapter 82 proceeding involving a peaceable entry made by the holder of a right of entry upon
a fee simple subject to condition subject, one would expect the Florida courts
to take the same position that was taken in Florida Athletic & Health Club v.
Royce, discussed at note 92 infra, namely, that the case involves a question of
title and therefore the actual possession of the party entered upon must be regarded
as entitling him to possession. In consequence, it would seem that such a right
of entry could be effected by self-help in Florida only in a situation in which
the holder of the fee simple subject to condition subsequent does not have actual
possession of the land. A fortiori, entries by holders of possibilities of reverter or
executory interests should be treated as involving "questions of title." The "right
of entry" that a vendor under an installment land contract may have against
his vendee in default presents a more difficult problem, but such a controversy
seems more akin to the landlord-tenant controversy, that is, it seems not to involve a question of title but merely the "right to possession."
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There are other statutes that are relevant to any consideration of
the possibility of the lawfulness of a peaceable entry. Sections 83.20.38 provide an even faster summary procedure for the removal of
tenants than is available under section 82.04. Such procedure is
restricted by section 83.20 to use in two situations: (1) "Where . . .
[the tenant] shall hold over and continue in the possession of the
demised premises, or any part thereof, after the expiration of his time,
without the permission of his landlord;" and (2) "Where . . . [the

tenant] shall hold over without permission as aforesaid, after any
default in the payment of rent pursuant to the agreement under which
such premises are held, and three days' notice in writing, requiring
the payment of such rent or the possession of the premises, shall have
been served by the person entitled to such rent on the person owing
the same."7 7 Oddly enough, these two situations appear to include
all those in which a landlord would be entitled to immediate possession, as discussed under the subheading SOME PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS of this article, assuming that the words, "after the expiration of his time," refer to a holding over after a lease has been
prematurely terminated by a landlord pursuant to its provisions as
well as the usual type of holding over beyond the gross period of
the lease. Situation number (2) specified in section 83.20, except
for the special notice provision, appears to cover the same ground as
section 83.05, which is probably the only situation in which in
Florida a landlord can be entitled to immediate possession without
8
the tenancy having been terminated7
What then is the impact of sections 83.20 - .38 and the statutes in
chapter 82 (forcible and unlawful entry and detainer) on section
83.05? It will be recalled that section 83.05 is the earliest of the
Florida statutes being discussed in this article, having been enacted
in 1828, and uses quite direct language: "If any person leasing or
re-renting any land or house shall fail to pay the rent at the time
it becomes due, the lessor may immediately thereafter enter and take
possession of the property so leased or rented." 79 It will also be recalled, in view of the common law rule allowing forcible entry and
of the absence of any statutory prohibition of forcible entry in Florida
until 1868, that section 83.05 had the effect of allowing the landlord
to recover possession by a forcible as well as a peaceable entry. Although it is conceded that recovery by a forcible entry has been outlawed since 1868, it is submitted that section 83.05, to have any
meaning at all today, must be interpreted as allowing recovery of
possession by a peaceable entry. It was not repealed or modified in
77.
78.
79.

FLA. STAT. §83.20

(1965).

See text at notes 13-15 supra.
FLA. STAT. §83.05 (1965).
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1868, which is some indication that the prohibition of "unlawful"
entries in the forcible entry and detainer statutes enacted that year
was not intended to prohibit all peaceable entries against the possessor's consent and unsanctioned by court order. Because it was not repealed or modified in 1881 when section 83.20 was first enacted also
seems to indicate that section 83.20 was not intended to prescribe the
sole means by which the landlord's right to possession on the tenant's
default in payment of rent is to be put into effect, just as section
83.20 does not prescribe the sole means by which the landlord's right
to possession against a tenant holding over after the expiration of his
lease is to be effectuated (section 82.04 affording at least one alternative means for the latter). In this connection, it should be noted
that the introductory language of section 83.20 certainly sounds as
though it were affording an additional, rather than a mandatory or
exclusive, remedy: "Any tenant . . . may be removed from such
premises in the manner hereinafter provided in the following cases
...
,80 True, the speediness of the remedy afforded by sections
83.20 - .38 takes away much of the practical justification for allowing
any remedy by self-help, but can one legitimately conclude therefrom
that the legislature intended to eliminate such other remedies despite
the total absence of any indication of such intent in the statutory
language used? It could be argued that the legislature, in enacting
section 83.05 originally or at least in leaving it unaltered on the
statute books after the enactment of section 83.20 in 1881, did not
intend to declare a remedy by self-help, but intended merely to create
a right to possession or a right to terminate the tenancy in favor of
the landlord upon the tenant's default in payment of rent. In other
words, the argument would be that section 83.05 set up a right of
possession in derogation of the common law in such circumstances, and
is not to be understood as saying anything about the means by which
that right may be given effect.8' If so, the language used in section
83.05, whatever it conveyed to the Florida lawyer of 1828, apparently
does not convey the same sense to the Florida lawyer of 1966.82
Moreover, if such is the true meaning of section 83.05, it is difficult
to see why it was retained after the enactment of section 83.20, which
80.
81.

FLA. STAT. §83.20

(1965).

See Stephenson v. National Bank of Winter Haven, 39 F.2d 16 (5th Cir.

1930).
82. See O'Toole, Landlord and Tenant, in 3 FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY
PRAcTICE 227 (1966) (a publication of The Florida Bar). Judge O'Toole lists
the available remedies from which a landlord must choose. Besides the summary
procedure afforded by §83.20 and the unlawful detainer proceeding under chapter
82, he indicates that the landlord may choose "to take possession of the premises
by eviction for his own use under the statutory right of peaceful re-entry described in §83.05." (Emphasis added.)
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appears adequate both to declare a right in the landlord to possession
and to prescribe a remedy for such right.
In summary, it is submitted that a proper construction of the
statutory prohibition of "unlawful entry" in chapter 82 does not take
away the landlord's remedy of self-help by peaceable entry, which
he had at common law and which is ostensibly "extended" by statute
to the circumstances covered by section 83.05. And section 83.20,
properly construed, provides not an exclusive, but simply an additional, remedy. It should be noted, also, that even if one places the
opposite construction on these statutes, and succeeds in reconciling
section 83.05 with that construction, there still remains the seemingly
unreconcilable exception relating to tenants of apartment houses,
rooming houses, and the like, found in section 85.18, previously discussed. 3
Having examined the statutes on the issue of the lawfulness of a
peaceable entry, a look at the case law is now in order. In the
writer's opinion, it does not yield a clear answer. In a number of
cases, the language used by the Florida Supreme Court seems to indicate that a peaceable entry is lawful. In Liddon v. Hodnett,8 4 an
early case that fails to disclose the relationship of the parties involved,
the court attempted to classify the situations in which the forcible
entry and unlawful detainer statutes give a recovery of possession to
one turned out or deprived of his possession, as follows:8 5
(1) Where another enters in any case where entry is not given
by law. (2) Where another enters with strong hand or multitude of people, even in case where entry is given by law. (3)
Where another who has entered both lawfully and peaceably
holds over after the expiration of his right and against the
consent of the party entitled to possession. The first and
second classes are unlawful entries, the second differing from
the first in that the latter is made unlawful by the fact of its
being with strong. hand or multitude of people, however
rightful ft may otherwise be.
It is interesting to note that the court in so doing used the provisions
of the first and second clauses of section 82.01 together with section
82.04 to make up its classification, and made no attempt to work in
the enigmatic provisions of section 82.02 which, as we have seen,
83. See text at notes 62-66 supra. It is worth observing that §§83.05 and
85.18 appear to complement, rather than overlap, each other. The former covers
only tenants of "land or house[s]"; the latter, only tenants of rooms and apartments.
84. 22 Fla. 271 (1886).
85. Id. at 275.
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pose the major obstacle to finding a peaceable entry lawful. In
Goffin v. McCall,s 6 which involved a suit for unlawful entry between
two rival claimants to ownership of some vacant lots that the defendants had entered upon and enclosed, the principal point made
by the court was that there could be no suit for either forcible or unlawful entry unless the complainant had been in actual possession
at the time of the entry. But the court added the following significant statement: "An entry by the owner of the title who has the
right of entry or by one who enters under a bona fide claim of title
where it can be effected in a peaceable, easy and open manner is
not an unlawful entry because it is given by law."87 Again, in Hewitt
v. State ex rel. Palmers (which fails to indicate the relationship of
the parties), the court in defining "forcible entry" clearly indicated
that a peaceable entry, in the landlord-tenant context, is not an
"unlawful entry": "But an entry without force by a party entitled to
possession, or an unlawful entry without actual force, violence or
menaces, and which has no other force than such as the law implies
in every trespass, is not a forcible entry within the meaning of the
statutes."8 9 A final quotation comes from the case of Waits v. Orange
Creek Turpentine Corp.,90 which did involve a landlord-tenant controversy. In that case, a tenant succeeded in enjoining his landlord
from trespassing. The lease authorized re-entry and repossession by
the landlord in the event of the tenant's failure to abide by any
covenant of the lease, but the court found no showing of noncompliance on the tenant's part. In the following statement, the court
clearly assumes that the landlord's entry would not be unlawful if
the tenant had violated one of the lease's covenants: "The rule is
well settled that a landlord may under the terms of a lease or at its
expiration re-enter and take possession of the leased premises and defend his possessions against all persons but he is bound by the provisions of the lease for re-entry. "91
Three other cases require discussion, since they come as close as
any to saying that a peaceable entry is unlawful. One is Florida
Athletic & Health Club v. Royce. 92 This was an action for "unlawful
entry" under chapter 82 of the Florida Statutes. There is no indication in the opinion that the parties stood in the relationship of landlord and tenant. Indeed, the fact that the court ruled as error the
trial judge's admission of evidence of title points toward a contro86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

91 Fla. 514, 108 So. 556 (1926).
Id. at 521-22, 108 So. at 559. (Emphasis added.)
108 Fla. 335, 146 So. 578 (1933).
Id. at 339, 146 So. at 579 (Emphasis added.)
123 Fla. 31, 166 So. 449 (1936).
Id. at 35, 166 So. at 451.
160 Fla. 27, 33 So. 2d 222 (1948).
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versy over ownership. It is clear that the entry could in no wise be
regarded as forcible, the caretaker employed by the plaintiff club
having voluntarily yielded possession to the defendants (without
authorization from the club, of course). The contention upheld by
the court was that the plaintiff need prove only that it was in actual
possession, that it was ousted from possession without its consent and
without the assistance of any writ of possession or similar order resulting from any court proceeding, that possession continues to be
withheld from it without its consent, and that the ouster occurred
within three years of the filing of the action. The opinion reveals
that the court drew from sections 82.01 and 82.02 the words "[not]
given by law" and "without consent" as the elements making- an
entry unlawful, and then proceeded to treat these as meaning "not
given by judicial proceeding," and "without consent of the party
in possession." This process of reasoning appears most clearly in the
following quotation: "The Florida statute divides the action into two
parts, one part, 'unlawful entry,' is applicable where the entry is
without force but without due process of law and without the consent
of the party in possession, and the other, 'forcible entry,' where the
93
entry is accompanied by force or with a multitude of people ...
It has already been shown that assigning such meanings to these
statutory words is hardly an easy matter, but the court's opinion gives
us no justification for its conclusions apart from quoting the statutes
and various excerpts from Liddon v. Hodnett,94 Goffin v. McCall,95
and Hewitt v. State ex rel. Palmer,96 all of which, as previously noted,
contain language favorable to the lawfulness of a peaceable entry.
It is submitted that this case, despite the meanings it assigned the
statutory words in question, is not authority for using the same
reasoning in the landlord-tenant context. If the statutes in chapter
82 are to be applied in a controversy between two claimants of the
ownership in fee, the actual possession at the time of the entry must
suffice, in such a controversy, to show the "right of possession" and
the "party entitled to possession," as such words are used in the
statutes. This conclusion results from the fact that in such a controversy the right of possession depends on which party has title, and
section 82.05 states that no question of title shall be involved in actions
under chapter 82. That such consideration loomed large in the
court's mind in this case is demonstrated by the concluding paragraphs of the opinion, in which the court quoted section 82.05 a
second time and indicated that the ultimate right of possession must
93.

Id. at 31, 33 So. 2d at 225. (Emphasis added.)

94. 22 Fla. 271 (1886).
95. 91 Fla. 514, 108 So. 556 (1926).
96. 108 Fla. 335, 146 So. 578 (1933).
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be determined in a suit in ejectment or trespass to try title. As
already noted, the same considerations do not apply in the landlordtenant context; the latter parties can try the "ultimate" right of
possession, at least under section 82.04 (unlawful detainer).
The second case is Adelhelm v. Dougherty,9- which was a suit by
a tenant for damages for unlawful entry and wrongful eviction by
his landlord. The facts are puzzling. The landlord had commenced
judicial proceedings for the removal of the tenant and obtained a
default judgment on which a warrant of possession was issued. But
before the warrant was executed, the tenant got the judgment vacated,
and this fact was communicated to the landlord. Thereafter, the
landlord, armed with the void warrant (which he apparently thought
still valid), got a deputy sheriff to accompany him to the premises.
Finding no one at home but new locks on the doors, they secured
entrance with the help of a locksmith and moved the tenant's belongings out. The Florida Supreme Court, upholding judgment in favor
of the tenant, said:9 8
It seems to us that the statement of the case answers the
questions propounded....
It is elementary that no person has the right to forcibly
enter premises in the possession of and occupied by another,
whether the person occupying the premises happens to be in the
premises or absent therefrom at the time. The law provides
an adequate and speedy remedy for the acquisition of possession
of premises which are wrongfully held by another and in this
case the defendants in the court below had no more right to
enter the premises by procuring keys to the locks placed thereon
by the occupant than they would have had without having
filed any proceeding to acquire possession of the property because the judgment awarding them possession had been canceled ....
The court's opinion does not discuss or even cite any of the Florida
statutes or previous Florida cases. It appears that the errors assigned
by the defendant on his appeal predicated the lawfulness of the entry
upon the fact that it was performed by an officer of the law, acting in
his official capacity, and ostensibly pursuant to court process. The
bulk of the opinion was devoted to disposing of this contention. It is
thus unreasonable to view the opinion as a considered, authoritative
statement on the lawfulness of self-help unaided by judicial process.
The extent to which it says anything on the latter subject is shown,
in its entirety, in the quotation set forth above. The quotation demon97.
98.

129 Fla. 680, 176 So. 775 (1937).
Id. at 684, 176 So. at 777. (Emphasis added.)
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strates that the court considered this to be a forcible entry. And, in
light of the fact that the premises were a dwelling house (rather than
an apartment or room), it is "elementary" that self-help by forcible
entry is civilly unlawful in Florida. How then does one dispose of
the fact that the opinion, at its outset, tells us that the action was to
recover damages for an "alleged unlawful entry," rather than for a
forcible entry? The explanation is found further on in the opinion,
where the court tells us that this was an "action in tresspass." Thus
the action apparently was not a chapter 82 proceeding at all, and
the court was not referring to "unlawful entry" in the special sense
in which it is used in those statutes, that is, as meaning a nonforcible
entry which is not "given by law." Actually, then, Adelhelm v.
Dougherty really tells us nothing about the lawfulness of a peaceable
entry.
9
The third case is the recent one of Ardell v. Milner.0
Unlike the
cases previously discussed, this was not a decision of the Florida Supreme Court, but one by Florida's Third District Court of Appeal. The
opinion tells us that the action was one for unlawful eviction, but
there is nothing to indicate that it was a proceeding under chapter 82.
In fact, the opinion never mentions any of the statutes in chapter 82,
though it discusses the English statute of 1381. The case is interesting
in that it does mention sections 83.05 and 83.20. The tenant, a dentist,
had rented an office under a written lease. When the landlord failed
to provide adequate air conditioning, the tenant withheld certain
rentals due. Thereupon tbhe landlord entered the office at night and
changed the locks, thus evicting the tenant. The court, reversing a
directed verdict for the landlord and remanding the case, briefly
outlined the effect of the English statute of 1381 on the common
law doctrine of self-help, concluding: 100
Thus, except where reentry can be made without force, the
right to reenter at common law is simply the right to maintain
ejectment....
However, under the common law, non-payment of rent does
not as a general rule work a forfeiture and confers no right
of reentry. . . In Florida, the Legislature has enacted §83.05
... giving the right to entry upon default in rent in derogation
of the common law ....
It appears that Ch. 83 [presumably
the court is referring to sections 83.20 - .38] . . . provides for
summary remedies by which a landlord may speedily regain
possession and said remedy is exclusive of the right of the
landlord to make a forcible entry . . . . [citing Adelhelm v.
Dougherty].
99. 166 So. 2d 714 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
100. Id. at 716.
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It is obvious that the court is regarding the entry here involved as a
forcible one. Surely no one can quarrel with its conclusion that,
though a right of entry is conferred by section 83.05 upon default in
payment of rent, any possibility of exercising that right by means of
a forcible entry is excluded by the Florida statutes. 1 1 (The writer
feels the opinion is misleading as it appears to ascribe that exclusion
to the supposed "exclusiveness" of the remedy prescribed by sections
83.20 - .38. Rather it should have attributed the exclusion to the
flat prohibition of section 82.01). Unfortunately, the opinion fails
to disclose how the landlord obtained entry into the office on the
night in question, so, as with the Adelhelm case, we have no alternative to classifying this case as just another case of forcible entry which
tells us nothing about the lawfulness of a peaceable entry.
Distinguishinga Peaceable From a ForcibleEntry
If a peaceable entry is lawful in the landlord-tenant context, there
remains the question left aside earlier when "peaceable entry" was
defined to mean any entry that falls short of a forcible entry: What is
a forcible entry as opposed to a nonforcible entry? The old statutory
language -"with strong hand or with multitude of people," juxta''
posed to the phrase, "in a peaceable, easy and open manner 102 doubtless has left to modern courts a fair margin for the accumulation of judicial gloss. It has already been noted that the English
courts interpreted a forcible entry to include the use of threats or
violence either in effecting an entry or in putting out the occupant or
his belongings after entry.' 03 The problem now is to discover where
the Florida courts appear to draw the line. As the reader has probably
suspected from the cases already discussed, there has been some
tendency to blur the line. The following cases will no doubt reinforce
that suspicion.

1

04

An early Florida case that gives some warning of the dimensions
of this problem is Walls v. Endel.105 In that case, the defendants
101.

The statement in the text is subject to the possible exception created by
(1965), discussed at notes 62-66 supra, which was probably in-

FLA. STAT. §85.18

applicable to the facts in Ardell v. Milner because the dentist's office was not
situated in a hotel, apartment house, rooming house, or boarding house.
102. The language is that of FLA. STAT. §82.01 (1965), but is virtually identical
with that of the old English statute of Richard II.
103. See text at note 55 supra.
104. The writer believes that for the problem now to be discussed, unlike
those previously discussed, cases that do not involve landlords and tenants are
just as authoritative as those that do. Thus, no particular effort is made to point
out in these cases any identification (or lack of identification) of the relationship
of the parties involved.
105. 17 Fla. 478 (1880).
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claimed to have acquired title to the plaintiff's house by a deed executed by the plaintiff and his wife, and thus argued that the plaintiff
had remained in possession as their tenant. When the plaintiff was
taken to an insane asylum, the defendants made frequent visits to
the house and "importuned" his wife to give up possession to them,
representing to her the poverty and helplessness of her condition, that
her title was gone, that she could not afford to pay the rent they de
manded, and that they had rented the premises to another. She was
thus induced to leave, and the defendants entered and took possession.
Reversing a judgment in favor of the defendants, the Florida Supreme
Court evidently accepted the sufficiency of this evidence to establish
a forcible entry: 10 6
The yielding by the "sick and worried" wife of the lunatic of
the possession, under these circumstances, can have no influence upon the rights of Walls, nor upon the rights of the
defendants.
The degree of "force" necessary to be shown to sustain the
charge of a forcible entry may be ascertained by consulting
the American cases cited in ....
The apparent absence of any actual threat of violence, either explicit or implicit, indicates some lack of objectivity in the test of
forcibleness applied by the court. It is as though the court were
placing itself in the particular circumstances of the party "entered
upon" and asking itself whether she probably did experience fear
for her safety in her state of mind at the time, rather than asking itself
whether a dispassionate observer of the scene would reasonably have
apprehended a likelihood of violence.
Another early case in which it is difficult to see how the court
found a forcible entry is Greeley v. Spratt.107 In that case the plaintiff was occupying a room as his law office, leaving it locked at night.
The defendant had his agent enter it at night by means of a skeleton
key, remove the plaintiff's furniture and belongings, and put someone else into possession. When the plaintiff returned the next
morning, he found his furniture in the hall and the agent putting a
new lock on the door. When he sought to enter, he was not allowed
to do so, someone inside placing his foot against the door. The
Florida Supreme Court sustained a judgment of forcible entry. A
few years after the Greeley case, the Florida Supreme Court had
occasion to distinguish its facts from the very similar facts of Livingston v. Webster.o8 In the latter case, the court reversed the trial
106. Id. at 483.

107. 19 Fla. 644 (1883).
108. 26 Fla. 325, 8 So. 442 (1890).
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judge's decision because the evidence failed to show that the entry
was forcible. The evidence indicated that the plaintiff had put one
Du Bois in possession of the premises as his agent, and that Du Bois,
though not in occupancy himself, allowed a porter to sleep there at
night. The porter apparently decided to quit the premises, and
without any authorization from the plaintiff or Du Bois, turned over
the keys to one Masters, who turned them over to the defendant.
The defendant and Masters went to the premises one evening, used
the keys to unlock them and secure entrance, and placed the defendant's agent in possession; and the agent refused entrance to Du Bois
when the latter came by the next morning. Distinguishing Greely
v. Spratt, the court said: 10 9
In that case the defendant, in the night time entered Spratt's
law office by means of skeleton keys, and after entering he
threw Spratt's office furniture out of the room or office, and
forcibly prevented Spratt from entering the office. The entry
and the throwing the goods out of the office was [sic] one and
the same transaction, and taken together they were of such a
character as to inspire apprehension of violent acts toward
Spratt and his property, and therefore, a case of forcible entry
was made out ....

We are aware that there are some authorities to support
the position of the appellee that the entry of the premises by
means of keys was such an entry as to make out a case of forcible
entry, but the great current of decisions is against this proposition, for in all cases, unless there is some use of force, or of
threats and intimidation, there is no forcible entry. ...
In Hewitt v. State ex rel. Palmer,b the facts relied upon to show

a forcible entry were that the defendant secured a key from a previous
tenant, made a new one from it, and by this means secured entrance
to the house occupied by the plaintiff which she kept securely locked;
that the defendant immediately left upon discovering the plaintiff's
presence; that the plaintiff then placed new locks upon the house;
but that the defendant again "forced admission" against the will of
the plaintiff by use of a skeleton key. In a footnote to the opinion,
the court states:'
That surreptitiously forcing an entrance into a locked house,
either by use of skeleton keys, or by breaking off the locks,
would tend to a breach of the peace and possible homicide on
109. Id. at 331-32, 8 So. at 444.
110. 108 Fla. 335, 146 So. 578 (1933).
I11. Id. at 340 n.*, 146 So. at 580 n.l.
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the part of the occupant defending possession, can scarcely be
gainsaid. Therefore, such conduct amounts to a forcible entry
of the premises.
It will be recalled that in Adelhelm v. Dougherty"1 2 the court appears to have treated as forcible an entry obtained by having a locksmith "pick" the new locks that had been placed on the house by the
plaintiff. 1 3 Although in that case the plaintiff was absent from the
premises at the time, the defendants did not appear to have chosen
the time of their entry for that reason, so there was probably nothing
"surreptitious" about their activities as there had been about those
of the defendant in the Palmer case. Of course, in Adelhelm v.
Dougherty, there was the added element of removal of the plaintiff's
belongings from the house, but it would be difficult to characterize
them as having been "thrown out."
What is the teaching of these cases about where the line is to be
drawn between forcible and nonforcible? None has overruled or
even discussed the others, except to the extent already indicated.
Perhaps the answer is that no hard and fast line can be drawn, that
the court will always review the totality of the defendant's acts in light
of the prior relations between the parties, and make its own estimate
whether such acts, in such context, would reasonably excite fear of
violence to person or property in the mind of the occupant (without
regard to whether he is in fact present or absent at the time). On
the other hand, a distinction might be drawn between an entry of
locked premises effected by means of skeleton keys or the like, which
should be regarded as equivalent to "breaking" the lock, and an entry
effected by means of regular keys legally obtained or even by an
entry of unlocked premises. 14 Such a distinction would draw a rather
fine line, but one that perhaps is not wholly without merit. In any
event, what the defendant does after he "gets in" is just as germane
in Florida to the issue of forcibleness as it has been in England. If
after entering he "throws out" the occupants' belongings, the entry
will be regarded as forcible. If, however, he takes care to remove
their belongings to other suitable shelter and to avoid damaging
112. 129 Fla. 680, 176 So. 775 (1937).
113. One case in which entry was thus effected held that the entry was not
unlawful, but the reason there was the court found that the real estate broker
who so entered and placed the defendant in possession was acting as the plaintiff's agent at the time. Accordingly the case, Caplan v. Burns, 149 Fla. 429, 6
So. 2d 8 (1942), is not germane to our discussion.
114. One case in which the defendant had opened an unlocked gate in a
fence held the entry forcible, but there was the additional fact that after thus
securing admission into the enclosure he "drove" the plaintiff's cattle out. See
Chapman v. State ex rel. Carlton, 152 Fla. 183, 11 So. 2d 335 (1943).
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them in the process, the fact of removal should not suffice of itself
to render the entry forcible. Otherwise, no entry could really be
effective as a repossession without being held "forcible." For the same
reason, the fact that the defendant proceeds to refuse entry to the
former occupants whom he dispossessed, and even backs up that
refusal by force, should be irrelevant in determining whether the
entry was forcible. 1 5
Can the Partiesby ContractAlter the Results
That the Courts Would Otherwise Reach?
The question to be discussed in this subpart is probably the most
crucial of all, yet happens to be one on which the decided cases give
practically no guidance at all. And as one would expect, the statutes
are wholly silent on this issue. The question can be divided as follows: (1) If, contrary to the conclusions previously suggested in this
article, it is determined that a peaceable entry (in the landlordtenant context) is unlawful because chapter 82 prohibits all entries
without the consent of the person in possession and without the assistance of judicial process, or because section 83.20 provides an exclusive remedy, may a landlord and a tenant nevertheless validly
provide by contract for civil nonliability for such an entry? (2) May a
landlord and a tenant validly provide by contract for civil nonliability
for a forcible entry? These questions would surely occur sooner or
later to any experienced practitioner in real property since the relationship of landlord and tenant is, at least at its outset, invariably
contractual, and the courts have traditionally regarded it as the sphere
par excellence in which the parties can "make their own law."
With regard to a peaceable entry, it is submitted that the parties
could provide validly for civil nonliability. As we have already seen,
the major obstacle to finding a peaceable entry lawful, even in the
absence of such a contractual provision, lies in the words, "without
consent," used in section 82.02. Would not such a provision constitute
"consent" of the tenant to the landlord's entry, thus rendering section
115. Such a refusal should properly be regarded as simply defense of a
possession, the retaking of which is already completed, and not as part of or
"coloring" the entry or retaking itself. In England, the rule is well established
that legal possession attaches to physical control, acquired even for a very short
period of time (if it be "definite and appreciable") by the rightful owner. See
Lows v. Telford, 1 App. Cas. 414 (1876). Thus, the entry would be regarded as
peaceable, and hence rightful. Refusal to readmit the tenant, though backed up
by force, would also be rightful because it is made in defense of a rightful possession lawfully acquired. Winn v. State, 55 Ark. 360, 18 S.W. 375 (1892); Smith
v. Detroit Loan 8: Bldg. Ass'n, 115 Mich. 340, 73 N.W. 395 (1897). But some
American courts have felt such reasoning undermines the basic reason for prohibiting forcible entries. See Mason v. Hawes, 52 Conn. 12 (1884).
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82.02 inapplicable? Conceivably, it could be argued that in the
creation of every tenancy the tenant impliedly consents to a re-entry
by the landlord upon termination of the tenancy."1 6 Accordingly
there would be no need to make explicit provision for such consent
in order to render section 82.02 inapplicable. In the writer's opinion,
the latter argument is not very persuasive. Consent, if implied at all,
would have to be "implied in law" from the legal nature of the
landlord-tenant relationship and not as a factual inference drawn
from the tenant's outward acts. But an express provision in the
lease is an entirely different matter. One can, of course, argue that
the "consent" referred to in the statute is "apparent consent at the
time of the entry," and that regardless of the lease provision for consent, the landlord is prohibited by section 82.02 from entering if at
7
that later time the tenant appears to have withdrawn his consent."1
But entirely apart from any effort to make the contractual provision
serve as the "consent" referred to in section 82.02, the fact remains
that the only prohibition that might exist in Florida against a peaceable entry is a civil one, giving rise to a civil right in the tenant that
he did not possess at common law. Therefore it is difficult to perceive
why he should not be allowed to waive such right as part of the
consideration for obtaining a particular lease. The writer believes
that most courts would find it difficult to hold such a contractual
waiver void as against public policy." s It is likewise felt that most
courts would have to be confronted with a far clearer indication of
legislative intent than that found in section 83.20 in order to hold
that the remedy prescribed by that section "excludes" any possibility
of the parties making provision by contract for the self-help remedy
of a peaceable entry.
The question with respect to a forcible entry presents a different
aspect. In this area we have to contend with a criminal statute, which
reads, "whoever forcibly enters into the possession of the lands and
tenements of another, and does not, upon demand made by the
116. See note 45 supra.
117. The opposing argument is that the lease represents the "bargain" struck
by the parties, which they intended to govern their entire relationship. It would
seem most unfair to allow the tenant, who acquired possession of the landlord's
property on the express understanding that he consents to a re-entry by the landlord, later to renege on their bargain by withdrawing his consent. In other situations the law has recognized that a consent or license to another to enter upon
land may be or become irrevocable. See I RESTATEmFNT (SEcoND), TORTS §§176-84
(1965) and in particular the Scope Note at 320.
118. See Clark v. Service Auto Co., 143 Miss. 602, 108 So. 704 (1926). Cf.
C.I.T. Corp. v. Reeves, 112 Fla. 424, 150 So. 638 (1933); McDowell v. James Talcott,
Inc., 183 So. 2d 592 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966), holding valid a contractual provision
for peaceable repossession of personalty without judicial process.
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party entitled to possession, vacate the same within four days after
the demand, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand
dollars."119 A glance at this language reveals that it raises almost
the same dilemmas of statutory construction as were raised by the
language of section 82.02: Does "of another" mean "belonging to
another" or does it mean "in the possession of another"? Does "the
party entitled to possession" mean what it seems to say, or does it
rather mean merely "the party who was dispossessed by the forcible
entry"? But even if we resolve these dilemmas in favor of the latter
interpretations, so that a forcible entry made by a landlord entitled to
possession is held to be criminally unlawful, 120 our question about
the effect of a lease provision authorizing re-entry by force is still
unanswered. It may be that a lease provision permitting the landlord to re-enter by force cannot make his act any less a crime.121
But although the legislature has found the public interest to require
the attachment of a criminal penalty to forcible entries, does it follow
that a contractual provision for civil nonliability for such entries is
therefore void as against public policy? Apparently, the majority of
American courts that have had occasion to consider the question
have held valid contractual provisions giving a privilege of entry by
122
force, notwithstanding the statute.
The only Florida cases that appear to have touched, even remotely, upon these questions are the two recent ones of Ardell v.
Milner,123 and Van Hoose v. Robbins,124 both being decisions by
intermediate appellate courts. The former appears to have involved
some type of provision in the lease authorizing the landlord to reenter in the event of the tenant's default, but unfortunately the
court's opinion does not tell us what it said. So we do not know
119. FLA.

STAT.

§821.30

(1965).

Other criminal provisions, such as those

prohibiting assaults, batteries, and breaches of the peace, may also be involved
in a particular case.
120. There are no Florida appellate cases construing these provisions of FLA.
STAT.

§821.30 (1965).

121. There are no Florida appellate cases directly in point on this issue, and
it would unduly lengthen this article to try to resolve the issue by argument
from analogy. See, however, Percifield v. State, 93 Fla. 247, 111 So. 519 (1927)
(no larceny in repossession of personalty by self-help from conditional vendee
who in contract had "consented" thereto).
122. See Goshen v. People, 22 Colo. 270, 44 Pac. 503 (1896); Fabri v. Bryan,
80 Ill. 182 (1875); Backus v. West, 104 Ore. 129, 205 Pac. 533 (1922); Virginia
Iron, Coal & Coke Co. v. Dickenson, 143 Va. 250, 129 S.E. 228 (1925). In support
of holding such a contractual provision void as against public policy see Jordan
v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 361 P.2d 20 (1961) (dictum); Spencer v. Commercial
Co., 30 Wash. 520, 71 Pac. 53 (1902) (dictum).
123. 166 So. 2d 714 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
124. 165 So. 2d 209 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
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whether the provision simply authorized a re-entry, or went further
and authorized the use of force if necessary. The position of the
court on the question is found in the following quotation:125
It appears that Gh. 83 ... provides for summary remedies by
which a landlord may speedily regain possession and said
remedy is exclusive of the right of the landlord to make a
forcible entry, even though the lease contains a provision permitting the landlord to re-enter. See: Adelhelm v. Dougherty
If the lease provision did not expressly authorize the use of force in
effecting the re-entry, then the court's statement that the landlord
has no right to make a forcible entry does not tell us anything new.
If, on the other hand, the lease provision did authorize the use of
force, then by failing to tell us so the opinion has certainly eliminated
all its value as authority for the proposition that the landlord still cannot make a forcible entry without liability. Even if the opinion had
told us that the lease expressly permitted re-entry by force, its authority would still be weak because (1) the only case it cites for its proposition, Adelhelm v. Dougherty, did not involve that particular point
at all, (2) the opinion gives us no rationale whatever for its conclusion, and (3) as already indicated, 1 26 the clear weight of authority
elsewhere is opposed to its conclusion. In any event, Ardell v. Milner
tells us nothing about the effectiveness of a lease provision to excuse
liability for a "peaceable entry."
The other case, Van Hoose v. Robbins, is of even less importance
as a guide in this area. Basically, it involved the assertion by a landlord of the common law right of distress of the tenant's goods for
rent due. In a replevin action brought by the tenant, the court held
that the Florida statutory proceedings for distress supersedes the
common law right, and that there is no provision in the former for a
self-executing possessory lien. It did not appear just how the landlord
got possession of the tenant's personalty, but the court, apparently assuming that some or all of it may have been taken from the leased
premises, uttered the following dictum:127
This general right of re-entry [that accorded by Florida Statutes, section 83.05], however, is not unqualified and may not
be asserted by trespass on the lessee's unforeclosed right of
possession .... Absent abandonment or voluntary relinquishment of the leasehold, the landlord's right to re-enter precedent
to taking possession should appear as a matter of contract or
be established by prescribed legal process.
125.

Ardell v. Milner, 166 So. 2d 714, 716 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).

126. See cases cited note 122 supra.
127. Van Hoose v. Robbins, 165 So. 2d 209, 211 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
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The statement implies that there is no right of either forcible or
peaceable entry against the tenant's consent and without aid of legal
process, except as the parties may have contracted for such right. It
seems fair to say that this court felt the parties could validly create
1
by contract a self-help remedy. 2s
"Constructive" Eviction129 or How a Landlord Can
Be Nasty Without Being Illegal
All of the prior discussion has assumed that the "self-help" employed by the landlord involves an entry upon and ouster of the
tenant from the leased premises, either with or without force. There
are, however, other less direct means by which a landlord could
conceivably get rid of a tenant who wrongfully remains in possession,
without going to court. Since such means would not, except by
resorting to pure fiction, contravene the forcible entry and detainer
statutes, it is correspondingly more difficult to find any actionable
wrong on the part of the landlord.
The first of these means to come to mind is the cutting off of
utilities or services, including heat, air-conditioning, water, gas, and
electricity. If these are to be supplied by the landlord under the lease
agreement, rather than arranged for by the tenant directly with the
utility company, and can be interrupted without physically entering
the leased premises, it is hard to see how the landlord could incur any
liability for cutting them off, since his obligation to supply them
has ended with the termination of the lease.130 The same would appear true of a failure to make repairs when the lease has shifted this
duty to the landlord. Of course, the success of such a device to get rid
of a tenant depends both upon how indispensable such services are
128. For a federal case from Florida that appears to assume the parties are
free to contract at variance with the statutory provisions, see the quotation in
the text at note 134 infra.
129. The term "constructive eviction" normally refers to any acts or omissions
of the landlord, short of actual physical ouster, which interfere so substantially
with the tenant's possession or enjoyment of the leased premises that he is, in
effect, deprived of the beneficial use of them. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§3.51 (Casner ed. 1952). It is almost invariably in issue in cases in which a
tenant has voluntarily abandoned the premises before the end of the tenancy and
is defending an action for rent on the ground that his landlord breached the
covenant of quiet enjoyment. In this article the term is applied in quite a different context to the same sorts of acts and omissions on the part of the landlord,
but excludes those acts that might constitute an "entry" in violation of the forcible
entry and detainer statutes.
130. Here we are again assuming, as elsewhere in this article, that the landlord
is entitled to immediate possession of the leased premises, which, generally
speaking, means that the tenancy has been properly terminated.
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to the enjoyment of the premises and upon how recalcitrant the
particular tenant is. 1 '
Other means exist only when the landlord retains legal control of
the areas surrounding or adjacent to the leased premises. Thus, they
are usually only available in instances in which the leased premises
consist of a room, apartment, or suite which is part of a larger
building. For example, it is perfectly conceivable that a landlord,
being in possession and control of the hallways of such a building,
could affix a padlock to the outside of the door leading into the leased
premises, erect a barricade, or otherwise interfere with or block the
tenant's ingress to the leased premises without ever effecting an "entry
of the premises." There is, of course, the danger in such case that a
claim of conversion of the tenant's personalty could be made because
he was deprived of access to it. But this danger could probably be
avoided by affixing a notice in plain sight to the effect that upon
request the tenant would be allowed to enter for the purpose of
removing his belongings. Obviously, such measures should not be
utilized while the tenant is inside the leased premises or an action
for false imprisonment might result.
Another example is afforded by a federal case that arose in
Florida, Stephenson v. National Bank of Winter Haven.132 In that
case the landlord, pursuant to the provisions of the lease, declared it
to be terminated when the tenant proffered an installment of rent
five days after it was due. The tenant, however, remained in possession. The landlord, while insisting that the tenant was now only
a tenant at sufferance and refusing to accept any further payments,
made no effort to obtain judicial aid in removing him. Instead, the
landlord commenced excavations on its adjoining property which
undermined and rendered untenantable the building under lease.
The tenant sued for damages, whereupon the landlord won a directed
verdict. The tenant seems to have urged that section 83.20 requires,
as a precondition to the removal of a tenant in default on his rent,
that three days' notice in writing demanding payment or possession
be served on the tenant. In reply the landlord maintained that section
13
83.05 makes no such requirement.1 3 The court said:
T

It does not appear to us that there is any inconsistency between these two sections; by one the lessor is given the power
131. It may also be that the cutting off of certain utilities, such as water,
might violate state piublic health laws. See FLA. STAT. chs. 385, 386 (1965).
132. 39 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1930).
133. The references are to FLA. STAT. §§83.20, .05 (1965), but the citations appearing in Stephenson are to earlier compilations containing those provisions.
134. Stephenson v. National Bank of Winter Haven, 39 F.2d 16, 17-18 (5th
Cir. 1930). (Emphasis added.)
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to terminate the lease, by the other his right to possession depends upon whether the rent is paid within three days after
demand. However that may be, neither section takes away
the power of the lessor and lessee to fix their rights by contract.
It was agreed in the ... lease that upon default .. . the lessee
should become a tenant by sufferance and should waive all
right of notice, not only to quit, but of demand to pay rent
as well. His failure to pay rent when it was due by his own
agreement made him a tenant by sufferance . . . . The conclusion is that . . . [the landlord] in making the excavations
complained of acted within its rights.
In its conclusion this case thus seems to follow in the tradition of the
English case of Jones v. Foley.135 The landlord will not be liable to
a tenant wrongfully in possession for actions which destroy the leased
premises or otherwise render them untenantable but which fail to
violate the forcible entry and detainer laws. There was nothing in
either case to indicate that the landlord took these actions for the
sole purpose of inflicting personal injury on the tenant or on his
belongings and thereby forcing him to vacate. If there had been such
evidence, the damage may well have been actionable as wantonly and
intentionally inflicted. Consequently, the cases may stand merely
for the proposition that a landlord who had planned to take such
actions in any event does not subject himself to liability to a tenant
who by wrongfully remaining on the premises simply "got in the way"
of such operations. Of course, it would be a rare occasion for any
landlord to be willing to take such drastic action against his own
property merely in order to get rid of a tenant. Few landlords would
be willing even to forego making needed repairs, just to get rid of
a tenant.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Undoubtedly, a forcible entry by a landlord entitled to possession will result in his being civilly liable to the tenant, unless the
leased premises are situated in a hotel, an apartment house, a boarding
house, or the like. Even in the latter apparently privileged situations,
the landlord will probably be liable for any use of more force than
was reasonably necessary to eject the tenant, for any force resulting
in serious bodily injury or death, and for any damage to the tenant's
belongings resulting from a lack of proper care in their removal. On
the criminal side, the landlord may subject himself to prosecution for
assault, battery, breach of the peace, or affray, if the entry involves
135.

See text at note 51 supra.
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violence to the person. Even if it does not, he may nevertheless be
subject to prosecution for the statutory offense of "forcible entry."
It is not clear that the definition of the latter offense covers a forcible
entry by a landlord entitled to possession, but the possibility must
be reckoned with. The privilege of forcible ejection apparently accorded to landlords of hotels, rooming and boarding houses, and
apartment houses could, however, conceivably protect them from
criminal prosecution as well as from civil liability.
There is no criminal liability attached to a peaceable entry, and
civil liability is not yet clearly indicated by the cases. But civil liability may well result from an extension to the landlord-tenant context
of the reasoning of FloridaAthletic & Health Club v. Royce.136 Even
if not, the possibility of recovering possession by means of a peaceable
entry can hardly be considered a realistic one because of the difficulty
of guessing correctly what conduct the courts will hold peaceable
and what forcible. A tendency to blur the distinction, and thus
swallow up all entries into the "forcible" category, is clearly discernible in the cases. Even in case a particular entry is held peaceable
and lawful, it would seem that the landlord ought to be liable for
any damage to the tenant's belongings resulting from a lack of proper
care in their removal and storage.
Whether the parties may vary their civil rights and liabilities by
contract in this area seems still an open question in Florida. The
only court pronouncements available to us are of uncertain import
and perhaps conflicting. What effect contractual provisions giving
"consent" to, or removing liability for, forcible entries may have on
the landlord's criminal liability is also an open question.
In view of the many questions left unanswered in this area, it is
doubtful that any lawyer should advise a client-landlord to try to
effect a peaceable entry and dispossession of his tenant, much less a
forcible entry. But even if there are enough "red flags" along the way
to warn off the prudent attorney and clients who consult him before
they act, is this really a satisfactory situation? Does not the State of
Florida in the second half of the twentieth century deserve a clearer
answer to this ancient question of the landlord's right of self-help?
In the writer's opinion it does, and the answer must surely come from
the legislature rather than the courts. The present confusing state
of the law is largely traceable to the statutes themselves, some of which
use 14th century language that was perhaps none too clear even in
that era. Others of more recent derivation, while reasonably clear
when considered by themselves, seem to have been enacted without
much thought for those laws already on the books.
136. See text and notes at note 92 supra.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol19/iss2/2

40

Barnett: When the Landlord Resorts to Self-Help: A Plea for Clarification
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XIX

If, then, statutory reform is so obviously needed, what direction
should it take? In the writer's view, there is something to be said for
the logical consistency of the position of English law. That position
is that the state's interest lies solely in discouraging the use of force,
and such interest can be adequately protected by the normal method
of imposing a criminal penalty. Hence, if the landlord can regain
possession peaceably, he incurs neither civil nor criminal liability;
and if he uses force, although he will incur criminal liability, he incurs
no civil liability to the tenant who is himself in the wrong for having
overstayed his tenancy. It is the idea of rewarding a delinquent
tenant, not only with restitution of possession but also damages, that
is repugnant. Perhaps this resolute refusal to reward the wrongdoing
tenant is the most appealing aspect of the English rule.
The major difficulty with the English position is that it assumes
the landlord is clearly entitled to possession. In many cases he is.
Perhaps the fact that the landlord was so obviously entitled to the
possession in the Hemmings case accounts for the unanimity of the
English appellate judges in that landmark decision. But in many
cases it is no simple matter, even for a lawyer, to determine who is
entitled to possession. Either the interpretation of the lease or the
fact of the tenant's default may be in bona fide dispute. Remember
also the problems dealt with under the heading SOME PRELIMINARY
CONSIDERATIONS in this article. Under the English rules, the landlord
is civilly liable, even for a forcible entry, only when he has misjudged
his right to possession. So there is a fair chance that he will not be
liable at all to the other party for dispossessing him, even by force.
A landlord may be willing to take this gamble and run the remote
risk of a criminal prosecution. What is wrong with letting him take
the gamble? If he decides correctly the issue of who is entitled to
possession, no real harm has been done. And if he decides wrongly,
the tenant can obtain restitution of possession and full damages in
a court of law. Yet this line of reasoning, in the writer's opinion, has
two fallacies. First, it is hard to justify letting one party to a dispute
have such a gamble, and not the other party. But if both parties
have such a choice, then possession acquired by either will remain
precarious because each may be encouraged in turn to resort to selfhelp. In other words, if there is any possibility that self-help will
succeed in regaining possession without liability, for both parties alike,
resort to it is unlikely to end with the first dispossession and there
is no telling where the contest will end. Serious violence may well
be the result. The other fallacy in the argument derives from the peculiar situation of the tenant. A considerable amount of real estate
under lease provides necessary shelter for the tenant, his family, his
belongings, and his business activities. The point is, if the landlord
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misjudges the right to possession and ousts the tenant by self-help,
the tenant may in many cases be effectively discouraged from enforcing the right to possession that he has. Why? Because once he is
deprived of the shelter of the leased premises, some adequate substitute
must, in most cases, be provided immediately. And once such a
substitute is found, regaining possession of the former tenancy and
securing damages through court action may be more trouble than
it is worth, especially if he has to prove all the facts and law showing
that he did have the right to possession. And it is probably true that
most tenants whom landlords dare to dispossess by self-help are
relatively poor anyway and thereby reluctant to seek the aid of
lawyers. In other words, the change in status quo brought about
by the landlord's resort to self-help usually has a far more drastic
effect on the tenant than maintenance of the status quo has on the
landlord. The effect may be so drastic that the tenant is discouraged
from enforcing his rights and is therefore deprived of them. This is a
serious matter in a society which has set for itself the goal," equal justice under law."
If, then, the tenant in bona fide dispute with his landlord ought to
be protected against dispossession by self-help, the question is whether
such protection can be afforded by the law without impairing the
landlord's right of self-help against a tenant who is clearly and knowingly in the wrong. The writer believes the only way the former can
adequately be protected is to eliminate the landlord's right of selfhelp altogether, not merely by establishing a legal rule to that effect,
but also by affording the speediest, most adequate, and least expensive
civil remedy the law can devise. In this situation a rule without such
a remedy is not worth much. Normal civil processes to enforce it are
too slow, and criminal enforcement does nothing toward making the
tenant whole. True, the rule may have some deterrent effect, but only
on lawyers or on landlords who consult lawyers before they .act,
but this is a small lot. The remedy ought to be so devised that
it can place a tenant back in possession within a week of his ouster.
The chapter 82 summary proceeding cannot operate that fast. In
any event, the remedy available to the tenant ought to be at least as
fast as that available to the landlord pursuant to Florida Statutes,
section 83.20. Moreover, the remedy should allow the tenant to recover
all his reasonable and necessary expenses, such as moving charges both
ways, the cost of substitute lodging or shelter, wages or profits lost, and,
in addition, some compensation for the inconvenience caused him.137
137. A fuller explanation of the remedy that presently exists is in order.
FLA. STAT. §82.16 (1965) states that in the event of a verdict in favor of the plain-

tiff, the court shall award a judgment for him that he recover possession of the
property "with his damages and costs" but FLA. STAT. §82.14 (1965) requires the
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Besides damages, the only elements the tenant should have to prove
are his actual possession of the premises prior to the ouster,
and his eviction by the landlord against his will

3s
1

Such issues

should be triable before a judge without jury, and default judgments
should be permitted. The time limitation for bringing such an action
should be considerably reduced from its present three years, at least
in the present context of landlord and tenant.
The reasons given above for eliminating the landlord's right of
self-help apply equally to forcible entries and peaceable entries. It is
submitted that the ancient distinction between the two has outlived
its usefulness. Either should be actionable by the tenant in the
special proceeding here recommended. Moreover, retaining the landlord's right of self-help in cases involving tenants in hotels, rooming
houses, boarding houses, and apartment houses does not have much
to recommend it, save the difficulty of distinguishing between "tenants" and mere lodgers in such places. It is difficult to see how most
of the types of "constructive eviction" mentioned could be made actionable as a wrongful ouster by self-help, though undoubtedly a
physical barring of the tenant's way of ingress to the premises could
and should be.
The final question is what effect should be permitted to lease
provisions authorizing the landlord to re-enter or relieving him from
liability for a re-entry. It is common knowledge that the vast majority
of leases, at least for residential property, are drafted for landlords
and in their favor. As long as we continue to indulge in the notion
that the tenant has read and understood the lease and all its provisions
before signing it, the landlord's right of self-help will never be effectively laid to rest. All the landlord need do is ensure that such a clause

jury, in case of recovery by the plaintiff, to fix his damages at double the rental
value of the premises from the time of the unlawful or wrongful holding (with
an exception for unlawful detainers that are not wilful or knowingly wrongful).
Such a measure of damages, in cases of dispossession of the tenant by the landlord, should usually cover the tenant's actual damage adequately, but sometimes
it may not. A Florida trial court case appears to have taken the position that
the plaintiff may sue for his items of actual damage in lieu of the rental value
of the premises. See Dorsey v. Horne, 11 Fla. Supp. 149 (County J. Ct. 1957).
138. Reducing the issues to these three -possession, ouster, and damageswill undoubtedly benefit many tenants who have no bona fide dispute with their
landlords about their lack of right to remain in possession but who nevertheless

refuse to vacate. It seems unfair that landlords should be compelled to hire a
lawyer and go to court to get rid of such persons, but the fact that the remedy
for ouster by self-help must be quick in order to protect the tenant who is in
bona fide dispute with his landlord probably outweighs the unfairness in such
cases. The judicial proceeding available to the landlord to remove a tenant is
relatively quick and inexpensive. See FLA. STAT. §§83.20-.38 (1965).
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is inserted, and nine times out of ten the prospective tenant will make
no objection. There is nothing wrong with clauses that merely give
the landlord a right to declare the tenancy prematurely terminated
on the tenant's default, but perhaps it is high time the legislature
declared a public policy against clauses authorizing the landlord to
serve as "judge, jury, and executioner."
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